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Abstract  Sassen’s identification of global cities as ‘strategic places’ is explored through world city network analysis. This involves searching out advanced producer service (APS) firms that constitute ‘strategic networks’, from whose activities strategic places can be defined. 25 out of 175 APS firms are found to be strategic and from their office networks, 45 cities out of 526 are designated as strategic places. A measure of ‘strategic-ness’ of cities is devised and individual findings from this are discussed by drawing on existing literature about how APS firms use specific cities. A key finding shows that New York and London have different levels of strategic-ness and this is related to the former’s innovation prowess and the latter’s role in global consumption of services. The strategic-ness of Johannesburg, Mexico City, Palo Alto, and leading Chinese and German cities are also discussed in terms of the balance between production and consumption of advanced producer services.  




In her classic The Global City Saskia Sassen (1991, 3-4) identified, as her ‘point of 
departure’, processes of globalization that had ‘created a new strategic role for major 
cities’ resulting in a ‘new type of city’ that ‘is the global city’. In her subsequent 
textbook on the subject, she distinguished global cities as one of three types of 
‘strategic places’ (Sassen 1994, 18) – later extended to four (Sassen 2006, 31) – but 
her discussion makes clear that it is global cities that are by far the most important 
strategic places in economic globalization. The prime purpose of this paper is to 
investigate cities as strategic places in contemporary globalization using the 
methodology developed as world city network analysis (Taylor 2001, 2004; Taylor et 
al. 2011a). This approach deals with many more cities than Sassen considers: here we 
ask the question, which of these numerous cities can be reasonably identified as 
strategic places? We deploy world city network analysis findings to answer this 
question quantitatively so that amongst the cities thus identified we can measure 
degrees of ‘strategic-ness’. From this we explore different ways in which cities are 
being strategic drawing on the literature dealing with individual cities. 
 
We treat the concept of strategic places as a specific expression of Eric Sheppard’s 
(2002) geographical positionality within globalization. One of the examples he draws 
upon in his broad discussion of positionality is the ‘status’ of cities being defined ‘by 
their position within transnational networks’ so that ‘one can see that the role and 
trajectory of such cities is bound up with their positionality’ (p. 324). In arguing that 
‘[o]ur understanding of the spatiality of globalization will be impoverished … if 
positionality is neglected’ (p. 319), Sheppard lists several advantages of this approach 
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(p. 319, 325-6) two of which are particularly relevant to our study of strategic places. 
First, there is the matter of mutuality across networks: the role of the non-local in 
constituting all local places whatever the scale of definition – the conditions for 
change depend upon ‘direct interactions with distant places’ and not just ‘local 
initiative’ (p. 319). Second, this same mutuality, which is the essence of network 
building, can lead researchers away from considering the ‘unequal power relations’ 
(p. 319) that also inhabit networks – all nodes are equal but some are more equal 
(strategic) than others. This fits neatly with our world city network analysis where it is 
advanced producer service firms that are the global network-makers and it is their 
urban agglomeration that creates Sassen’s global cities. Thus what is strategic has to 
be treated from two directions. From the perspective of cities there are key firms that 
operate as strategic networks, which cities need to be part of; but equally, from the 
perspective of firms there are key cities that are strategic places, where firms have to 
be. Thus our argument will bring together Castells’ (1996) spaces of flows and spaces 
of places into a single analysis and interpretation.  
 
We do not aspire to match the subtle and nuanced treatment of positionality that 
Sheppard achieves but we do attempt to provide a distinct empirical contribution to 
the discussion: a strongly-evidenced, theoretically-sound set of results that do add 
some subtlety to understanding cities in globalization. Our argument proceeds in six 
parts: (i) we present the basic model that we use which specifies contemporary inter-
city relations as an interlocking network; (ii) we describe the data required to 
operationalize the model by creating a service values matrix showing how firms use 
cities, and initial forms of analyses from these data are described for both firms and 
cities; (iii) specific findings for 2010 data are presented describing city-dyad contrasts 
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and globalization strategies of firms; (iv) strategic networks are derived from the 
globalization strategies and these are employed to identify strategic places; (v) the 
strategic-ness of cities is derived by relating strategic network positions to cities’ 
encompassing global network positions; and (vi) we interpret our findings in relation 
to what the literature says about specific cities we have found to be strategic places. 
What we have added to this literature is a comprehensive assessment of cities in this 
category. Our most notable finding concerns London and New York. These two cities 
dominate world city rankings and are often functionally linked together as ‘NYLON’. 
Not surprisingly, both figure as strategic places in this study, but we are able to 
separate them in terms of ‘strategic-ness’: we will disentangle NYLON within the 
overall framework of the world city network.  
 
Basic Model: Interlocking Network Specification 
Our first premise is that cities are formed through commercial relations with other 
cities (Jacobs 1969), and that these inter-city relations compose networks (Taylor et 
al. 2010). As the products of commerce, generic city networks are specified as 
interlocking networks. This type of network has an unusual formation in that it 
operates through three levels instead of two. As well as the net and node levels 
common to all networks, it has a third ‘sub-nodal’ level. This is its vital property for 
understanding commercial city networks because it is at the sub-nodal level that we 
find the agents of the networking process: firms who locate in the city and have 
relations with other cities are the network-makers. In identifying these agents we 
avoid reifying cities as economic agents: it is firms that create city networks by their 
everyday work through multiple locations. Therefore city networks encompass the net 
level at the scale of the economy the cities operate in, the node level as cities, and a 
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sub-nodal level as multi-location firms. In the specific case of the contemporary world 
city network, these are the global economy, important cities across the world 
including Sassen’s global cities, and leading advanced producer service firms (Taylor 
2001).  
 
The choice of specifying advanced producer service firms as the economic agents 
making the world city network derives directly from Sassen’s (1991) identification of 
this economic sector as key creator of her global cities. This occurs in two ways. First, 
global cities through their ‘control and command functions’ house corporate 
headquarters and agencies of government that provide the main market for advanced 
producer services. Second, it is these cities that are the production centers for 
advanced producer services, the places where product and process innovations keep 
growing this cutting edge economic sector. This consumption/production dual 
character of global cities will have a central role in interpreting the strategic places we 
identify below. However, we depart from Sassen’s use of advanced producer services 
to identify a small subset of cities as ‘global’ and instead recognise that advanced 
producer services are much more widespread than her discussion implies. We define a 
world city network based upon the activities of advanced producer service firms that 
encompasses several hundred cities across the world. This reflects the fact that 
economic globalization is an all-encompassing process; there are no ‘un-global cities’, 
just variations in the form and intensity of global processes across different cities 
based largely upon a city’s historical trajectory and contemporary positionality. Thus 
we specify the world city network in terms of the worldwide office networks of 
leading advanced producer service firms.  
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The world city network is formally specified in Taylor (2001); here we provide just a 
basic outline. The network is represented by a city-by-firm matrix Vij, where vi,j is the 
‘service value’ of city i to firm j. This service value is a measure of the importance of 
a city to a firm’s office network, which depends on the size and functions of a firm’s 
office (or offices) in a city.  
 
The inter-city connectivity between two cities a and i (ICCa-i) is defined as: 
 ICCa-i = ∑ va,j . vi,j (where a ≠ i)     (1) 
This provides a measure of the potential work flows, transfers of information and 
knowledge, between pairs of cities. The assumption behind conceiving the product of 
service values as a surrogate for actual flows between cities a and i for firm j is that 
the more important the office, the more links there will be with other offices in a 
firm’s network. In other words, we are using a simple interaction relation: two cities 
housing large offices will generate more inter-city work flows between them than two 
cities each with small offices.  
 
Typically in world city network analysis these inter-city connectivities are aggregated 
for each city and the totals are interpreted as the global network connectivity of a city 
(GNC), indicating a city’s overall importance within the network: 
GNCa = ∑ ICCa-i (where a ≠ i)     (2) 
This has been the main measure derived from the model and can be interpreted as 
how well a city is integrated into the world city network, and hence its ‘global status’. 
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Basic Data: Filling the Service Values Matrix 
To operationalize this model requires assessment of firms’ office networks to 
empirically construct a city-by-firm matrix Vij of service values. The data required for 
this exercise are readily available on firms’ websites where they promote their 
‘global’ status as a means of both impressing clients in a competitive services market 
and recruiting graduates in a competitive jobs market. However this source, plus 
supplementary information as available, produces different levels and types of 
information for every firm. Thus the data have to be converted using a simple coding 
system to enable cross-firm comparison for analysis. We have found that a coding 
from 0 to 5 has served this purpose; such numbers are the service values (vi,j in 
equation (1)) measuring the importance of city i in firm j’s office network. Thus, 0 
indicates a city where firm j has no presence, 5 is firm j’s headquarter city. Codes 1 to 
4 are then allocated as follows: a typical office of firm j scores a city 2, there must be 
something deficient to lower the score to 1, and something extra for it to rise above 2. 
For the latter, an especially large office scores 3, an office with extra-city jurisdictions 
(e.g. regional HQ) scores 4. Each firm is assessed individually to decide on boundary 
decisions away from 2. With n firms and m cities, such data collection creates an n 
firms x m cities array of service values, the basic matrix for interlocking network 
analysis. Each column of the matrix shows a firm’s location strategy as a string of 
integers from 0 to 5 across m cities; each row shows a city’s service mix as a string 
from 0 to 5 across n firms.  
 
In 2010 we assessed the office networks of 175 firms across 526 cities. The former 
consisted of 75 financial services firms and 25 each of accountancy, advertising, law 
and management consultancy firms. Firms were chosen using trade information 
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ranking firms by size based upon the latest information available (e.g. on turnover). 
Cities were chosen on the basis of previous experience in this work (315 cities used in 
earlier data collections) plus all other cities with more than 2 million population, all 
other capital cities of countries with over one million population, and all other cities 
housing the headquarters of one of our 175 firms. These are arbitrary rules of 
inclusion but the aim was to include more cities than necessary (526 in all) so as not 
to exclude any potentially relevant cities in what is a very dynamic process of world 
city network formation. The end result is a 175 firms x 526 cities matrix for 2010 
providing 92,050 service values for analysis. 
 
Specific Findings for 2010: City-dyad Analysis and Globalization 
Strategies 
There are two findings from analyses of these 2010 data that have stimulated the 
current paper. One concerns a city-dyads analysis that focuses on the inter-city 
connectivities as defined in equation (1) (Taylor et al. 2012a). The other is a principal 
components analysis of the service values matrix treating firms’ location strategies as 
the input, as 175 variables (Taylor et al. 2012b).  For full details of these analyses, 
readers are referred to the original papers; here we highlight specific findings that will 
directly feed into how we understand strategic networks and strategic places in 
subsequent analysis. 
 
In any city-dyad analysis of a large matrix such as ours, there are myriad pairs of 
cities whose inter-city connectivities can be computed as given in equation (1). The 
initial way of dealing with this surfeit of results is to concentrate on just the largest 
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connectivities: in this case only the leading 40 city-dyad connectivities are 
considered. In Table 1 the number of times each city from the top 20 cities as defined 
by global network connectivity (equation (2)) feature in the leading inter-city 
connectivities is listed. For instance, New York appears in more top 40 city-dyads 
than any other city, 10 times in all. Because global network connectivity is composed 
of inter-city connectivities (equation (2)), there will be a broad relation between 
overall global network connectivity and the number of leading city-dyads a city 
belongs to. For instance, it can be seen that there are 7 out of these 20 cities that do 
not feature at all in the leading city-dyads by inter-city connectivities and these are 
generally found in the lower ranks of global network connectivity in Table 1. But this 
relation is far from being definitive, Dubai has no partners in top 40 city-dyads 
despite being ranked 9th for global network connectivity. In stark contrast, Frankfurt, 
ranked a lowly 19th for global network connectivity, is a member of 8 such city-dyads, 
which puts it on a par with Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai and only one behind 
London. What can this mean? 
 
In such circumstances it is often the exceptions to the rule that are particularly 
informative and this is what makes the Dubai/Frankfurt comparison so intriguing. A 
city’s global network connectivity is an aggregate measure that tells us nothing about 
the specific inter-city connections that constitute it: how many connections it is 
composed of (i.e. the number of other cities it shares firms with), which cities it is 
more strongly connected to and where it is relatively weakly connected. Thus what 
appears to be happening with Dubai’s global network connectivity is that it is 
composed of a relatively dispersed pattern of inter-city connectivities featuring more 
lesser cities than expected for its global network connectivity ranking. Frankfurt, on 
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the other hand, tends to have a more concentrated pattern of inter-city connections 
constituting its global network connectivity, particularly featuring other major cities. 
Our preliminary interpretation is to link this to these cities’ positionalities in the world 
city network: Frankfurt has a more strategic position within the world city network 
than Dubai despite the fact that the latter is more generally integrated into the 
network. It was this train of thought that stimulated us to consider how we could 
extrapolate from this particular finding and measure the strategic-ness of cities more 
generally. To go down this research path requires us to examine the network-makers, 
the firms whose office networks lie behind the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast, and indeed 
other discrepancies in the relation between global network connectivity and 
membership of top 40 city-dyads displayed in Table 1. 
 
The second study we draw upon concerns analysis of advanced producer service 
firms’ office networks as location strategies. Obviously every firm considers its 
products and their markets when deciding to invest the capital to set up a new office 
in another city. Thus the outcome of these decisions at any one point in time 
constitutes a firm’s location strategy. This particular geography is represented by a 
firm’s column of integers in the service values matrix; for 2010 we have 175 such 
strategies. Although every strategy is different across our firms there are some clear 
similarities amongst them that can be teased out using a principal components 
analysis. This technique is a ‘data reduction’ method that converts x variables into y 
components where y is appreciably smaller than x. This is achieved by using the 
correlations between variables to combine them into groups of like variables, the 
‘principal components’ of the data. The importance of each component is derived 
from its correlations (called ‘loadings’) with the original variables. In the analysis 
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reported here the 175 individual firm location strategies (variables) were reduced to 
just 10 components that are interpreted as common location strategies. Of these 10 
components, two were much more important than the others, between them 
accounting for 40% of the common variance found in the service values matrix. We 
concentrate on these two common location strategies here. 
 
The characteristics of principal components can be discerned from their component 
scores on the objects of the analysis, in this case the cities. The scores for the two 
main components identified above, illustrating the two leading common location 
strategies from the 2010 service values matrix, are given in Table 2. These strategies 
are labelled intensive and extensive globalizations for reasons that will become 
apparent as we describe them. In each case we identify a ‘home-region’ on which the 
strategy is centered – most of the headquarters of the firms that constitute each 
component are to be found here (see Taylor et al. 2012b, Table 3) – and a ‘global 
outreach’ that identifies how the rest of the world is serviced through the location 
strategy. In both cases we find the home-region encompasses US cities plus London – 
we have coined the term ‘USAL’ to describe this global-regional formation (Taylor et 
al. 2012b). However, although overlapping, the constitution of these two regions is 
quite distinctive: in the first list in Table 2 there are 12 US cities plus London, in the 
second just three US cities plus London. With global outreach we find the obverse: 
just six cities in the first list but with 33 featuring in the second list. The reason for 
their specific labels is as follows. The intensive globalization strategy focuses on the 
prime locus through which economic globalization was initially constructed (USAL) 
with the rest of the world serviced through just three key cities in each of the two 
other major ‘globalization arenas’ – Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris in Western Europe 
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and Hong Kong, Tokyo and Beijing in Pacific Asia. In contrast the extensive 
globalization strategy emanates from just four main USAL cities combined with a 
very comprehensive servicing across the rest of the world: the top 5 cities in the 
global outreach are from regions beyond USAL, Western Europe and Pacific Asia 
(the latter two regions are represented, but primarily by their less important cities such 
as Kuala Lumpur and Athens).  
 
In what follows we use results from the two globalization strategies to try and 
understand the findings from the previous city-dyad analysis, specifically to 
generalize beyond the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast. 
 
Identifying Strategic Networks and Strategic Places  
In our model it is the firms that are the agents of globalization, the transnational 
network makers, and therefore to comprehend strategy we start by identifying 
strategic firms, and then use them to find the strategic places that are our initial 
concern in this paper. 
 
Although the two components are orthogonal (i.e. not related, their correlation equals 
zero), there will be firms that use elements of both common strategies as reflected in 
their loadings on the two components. These are the firms we will indentify as ‘global 
strategic firms’. Specifically, we use firms’ component loadings on (i.e. levels of 
correlations with) the intensive and extensive globalization strategies to define a 
‘global strategic measure’ for all 175 firms in our data. We compute the product of 
the loadings on the two components for each firm to create this measure. Global 
strategic firms are then identified as those with a measure of 0.10 and above. The 
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basic reasoning behind this procedure is to find firms with relatively high positive 
loadings on both components. Thus firms with a negative loading on one of the 
components are immediately eliminated. Firms scoring high on one component but 
not the other are similarly discarded: even with a rare high loading on 0.8 on a 
component, a firm would require a loading of at least 0.125 on the other component to 
reach a measure of 0.10. In a more balanced case, a firm loading 0.33 on both 
components would similarly just qualify. The results of this exercise are shown in 
Table 3 where 25 global strategic firms are listed. 
 
We can see from Table 3 that four out of the five service sectors in our data are 
represented; the exception is accountancy where firms tend to have large, ubiquitous 
networks of offices. Financial services are also under-represented – only three of the 
25 firms listed. This is perhaps a surprise since finance is often viewed as the core 
activity in a city to which other advanced producer services are attracted. However, 
our data include just the largest financial service firms and most of these have rather 
large office networks and therefore are less strategic, like accountancy firms. Thus the 
key sectors represented are law with 9 firms, management consultancy with 8 firms, 
and advertising with 5 firms. Apart from a single London firm, all the firms are US 
firms (i.e. in our previous parlance, they are all from USAL).  
 
We are now in a position to identify which cities are strategic places within the world 
city network: we define these as cities that house offices of 10 or more strategic firms. 
This produces a list of 46 cities shown in Table 4.1 The cities are ranked by their 
1 It should be noted that although this methodology includes arbitrary threshold decisions for 
defining strategic firms and strategic places, these were not the only ones tested in the 
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strategic network connectivity derived from computing the network connectivity 
defined by equation (2) but only including the 25 strategic firms in the calculations. 
Most of the cities Sassen (1991) mentions as ‘global cities’ appear in the top half of 
this table with the cities she focuses on being ranked first (New York), second 
(London) and tenth (Tokyo). From our previous discussion we can immediately note 
that Frankfurt (13th) ranks higher than Dubai (18th) supporting our preliminary 
suggestion that the former was more strategically placed in the world city network 
than the latter. We can now see that this finding is largely on account of Frankfurt 
attracting more strategic firms than Dubai: 20 to 15. All 25 strategic firms are found 
in London and New York, the latter is ranked higher because its offices tend to be 
more important than London’s (e.g. more headquarters): this is shown by the higher 
connectivity New York obtains from its strategic firms’ offices. Other cities with high 
connectivity per strategic firm office are Miami, just above New York, and 
Johannesburg and Düsseldorf just below New York. All three of these cities are 
specialist regional centers with important extra-mural functions (e.g. continental-scale 
regional headquarters). It is the variability in the two final columns of Table 4 that 
suggests there is more to the geography of strategic places than expressed through the 
absolute strategic connectivity totals we have used to rank the cities. 
 
research. The key point is that the different choices had very little effect on subsequent 
analysis. In other words, the results we present below are quite robust with minor differences 
having no relevance to the conclusions drawn.  
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Relating Strategic Network Connectivity to Global Network 
Connectivity 
We continue our exploration of strategic network connectivities by relating them to 
the cities’ original global network connectivities. This is most simply done by 
comparing ranks; these are both shown in Table 5 and with differences in ranks listed. 
Thus London and New York swap places at the top of the list but the most noteworthy 
changes are: 
• the large rises in the ranks of Chicago, Los Angeles, and especially San 
Francisco 
• the rapid rises of Frankfurt, Miami, Bangkok, Johannesburg and Düsseldorf, 
Stockholm, Auckland, Riyadh and especially Palo Alto 
• the modest but consistent reduction in ranks of leading Pacific Asian cities – 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo. Shanghai and Beijing 
• the large reduction in ranks of Dubai, Toronto, Brussels, Kuala Lumpur and 
Delhi. 
More generally, Table 5 fulfils our aim to generalise beyond the Dubai/Frankfurt 
contrast that first stimulated this study.  
 
Table 6 provides two ways of taking the analysis forward by moving from absolute 
measures of strategic network connectivities to relative ones. First, we present the 
percentages of a city’s global network connectivity that is strategic. In this 
interpretation of strategic-ness, Palo Alto is ranked first with by far the highest 
percentage – about one sixth – of its connectivity strategic. Clearly this is a special 
case – its extreme ranking difference in Table 5 showed this. What we have here is a 
city that is weakly connected into the world city network but is nonetheless a major 
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strategic place. Obviously this reflects the global high-tech status of Silicon Valley 
and we discuss how this relates to advanced producer services in the next section. 
Other points to note from the first list in Table 6 are that leading US cities dominate at 
the top – San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Miami – interspersed 
with both surprising and less surprising cities prominent in Table 5 – Auckland, 
Riyadh, Düsseldorf, Bangkok, and Johannesburg. In this list Frankfurt, ranked 12th, is 
very definitely recoded as more strategic than Dubai ranked 40th. But the most 
intriguing feature of this list is the separation of London and New York. In nearly all 
research on the world city network these two cities take the top two ranks but here 
New York is ranked a relatively high 6th while London drops to a relatively lowly 
23rd. This points us towards different roles of New York and London in the world city 
network expressed through their relative strategic positionalities. This finding will be 
at the heart of our interpretation of results in the next section. 
 
The second ranked list in Table 6 shows relative strategic-ness in a different way. 
Strategic network connectivity is regressed against global network connectivity and 
the residuals are recorded. These are standardized (zero mean and a standard 
deviation of one) so that positive numbers indicate relative strategic over-connected-
ness and negative numbers relative under-connected-ness. In this formulation New 
York is ranked first and London falls further down the list to 26th and is shown to be 
relatively strategically under-connected. This list is broadly similar to the percentage 
list with US cities dominating slightly more at the top, and Dubai falling even more 
below Frankfurt. This is our favored measure of strategic-ness since it expresses 
strategic connectivity deviations directly from what might be expected through a 
city’s global network connectivities. This strategic network geography that we have 
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uncovered within the world city network is shown in Figure 1; it forms the basis of 
our specific interpretations of strategic places and their differences below. 
 
Interpretation of Positionalities: Disentangling ‘NYLON’ and More 
The quantitative findings shown in Table 6 and represented in Figure 1 require 
interpretation based upon both theoretical extensions of the model employed and 
empirical knowledge of the cities as advanced producer service centers. In practice 
these two needs cannot be separated (and this is particularly the case when we try and 
comprehend our results on New York and London). However in terms of the 
empirics, clearly we cannot deal with all 46 cities and therefore we proceed as 
follows. We begin with consideration of London and New York, surely the world’s 
most studied cities, and focus on writings that have discussed their differences. In 
addition, our interpretation takes in Castells’ (1996) specification of his spaces of 
flows from which our model derives. We then deploy what we have learned from this 
prime city-dyad comparison to other specific cases. These are chosen from a mixture 
of intrinsic interest and availability of relevant literature to meet our needs. Thus we 
deal with China cities and German cities, Palo Alto, the highly strategic but weakly 
connected city, and two emerging market cities: Mexico City and Johannesburg, the 
former more strongly connected the latter more strongly strategic. In each vignette we 
bring in discussion of other cities as and when appropriate. 
New York and London  
New York and London define the only city-dyad that actually has a name: NYLON. It 
is part of a tradition that sees these cities at the forefront of fashion and which has 
been enhanced by economic globalization whereby leading world movers and shakers 
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are said to work through three offices, one in each city and another in transit over the 
Atlantic Ocean. Smith (2012, 421) describes how these two cities have come to be 
viewed as a single city: ‘a transatlantic metropolis that is the heart-beat of the global 
economy’. The key point that Smith makes is that the cities operate in conjunction for 
the benefit of a small rich minority. But the conflation of the two cities hides the 
differences that we are seeking. Their complementarities are based upon dissimilarity 
and this has been the subject of a careful comparison as global financial centers by 
Sassen (1999) and Wójcik (2011). 
 
According to Sassen (1999, 81) New York and London constitute ‘a cooperative 
division of labor’ that operates as follows:  
(i) ‘London is the preeminent city for global finance today, in good part due to 
numerous international firms that have located key operations and 
resources in the City [so that] London’s unique denationalized platform for 
global operations gives it its competitive advantage’ (pp. 83-4); 
(ii) But ‘what London lacks is Wall Street’s brilliant financial engineering’ and 
therefore ‘New York dominates in another way by offering market 
innovations and new financial products. Wall street – still the Silicon 
Valley of finance– has made U.S. investment firms leaders in the global 
market’ (pp. 83-4). 
More than a decade later it seems that this differentiation is still very much in place; 
Wójcik (2011, 6), in a new survey but also drawing on Strange (1997) and Michie 
(2006), describes it this way:  
‘While New York commands access to the largest and most liquid domestic 
financial market in the world, London’s physical, political and historical 
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geography implies access to a different time zone, European markets, and 
global connections … Taking advantage of its sheer liquid domestic market, 
and the deepest pool of financial engineering talent, New York leads financial 
innovation... Hedge funds come from the USA, and so do venture capital and 
private equity. Most new products and methods of trading in the global 
securities markets emanated from New York…. London, in turn, has 
specialized as a centre, where financial firms (with US banks in the lead) 
adapt financial innovation from the USA to foreign and international markets.’ 
The message is clear: London is particularly good for global financial business, New 
York is particularly good for global financial innovations.  
 
These key differences between New York and London in the world city network can 
be equated with Castells (1996, 413) distinction between hubs and nodes in his space 
of flows: 
‘Some places are exchangers, communication hubs playing a role of 
coordination for the smooth interaction of all the elements integrated into the 
network. Other places are the nodes of the network, that is the location of 
strategically important functions that build a series of locality-based activities 
and organizations around a key function in the network’ 
In these terms, London appears more ‘hub-like’ through integrating business while 
New York is more ‘node-like’ in building new functions, the latter interpreted as 
being more strategic. Further, there is a sense in which London is ‘used’ with New 
York firms as key ‘users’, indicating a hierarchical element in the cities’ 
complementarities that Sassen (1999, 81) recognised (see also Wall and Knaap, 
2011). And returning to her essential ‘global city’ process (Sassen 1991) where the 
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city is both a market for advanced producer services (APS) and a producer of APS, 
we can view the relationship between these two functions as variable across cities: 
high levels of new production relative to market (exchange) is a distinctive strategic 
place process, more focus on market service than production is a general network 
process. Such an interpretation provides both an explanation for our results showing 
New York exhibiting more ‘strategic-ness’ than London, and also suggests a general 
means of comparing cities in the world city network in terms of their relative 
strategic-ness.  
China Cities 
To illustrate the latter we can turn briefly to the China cities in our analysis using 
Lai’s (2012) study of the mutualities between Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai as 
financial centers. She describes a ‘dual headquarter strategy’ for Beijing-Shanghai 
relations and ‘parallel markets’ for Hong Kong-Shanghai relations. Although she 
equates Hong Kong’s role with that of New York (p. 1275), if we move analysis from 
city-dyad to city-triad a rather different picture obtains. 
 
The roles of the three China cities are quite distinctive. Beijing is the political center, 
‘responsible for policy-making and macro planning’ (Lai 2012, 1283), in other words 
the locus of command and control. Shanghai, on the other hand, ‘is tasked with testing 
new products, developing new markets and financial innovation’ (p. 1283). The result 
is that Shanghai has ‘the highest concentration of foreign banks’ and hosts ‘new 
financial markets in futures, derivatives and foreign exchange’ (p. 1283). In contrast 
Hong Kong has grown as a strategic conduit ‘connecting global capital and China’ (p. 
1275) and continues in the role of China’s ‘offshore financial centre.’ (p. 1275).  
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It takes very little imagination to equate this structural logic to similar relations 
between Washington as political center, New York as innovative center, and London 
as offshore center. In the latter case both London and Hong Kong have exploited a 
political autonomy by being outside the direct sovereign/administrative control of the 
USA and China respectively. In other words these are necessary global platforms 
where you can do things that are not possible in the cities of the USA and mainland 
China.  
 
Our analysis adds weight to this city-triad comparison. In both lists in Table 6 the 
three China cities appear ranked in the same sequence as the USAL cities: New York 
and Shanghai are relatively most strategic, with London and Hong Kong least, and 
Washington and Beijing in between. London and Hong Kong, in particular, have very 
similar levels of relatively low strategic-ness.  
Palo Alto 
As the main city in Silicon Valley, Palo Alto is a very special strategic place, as 
reflected in our analysis through its unusual combination of very low general 
integration into the world city network with very high strategic-ness. How does the 
production of high tech innovations that Silicon Valley is famous for transfer into 
APS innovation as our results imply? This special place has special servicing needs 
that have led to specialization in deal making, advising new firm start-ups and 
university spin-offs, arranging access to venture capital, taking successful firms 
public, plus mergers and acquisitions activity (Lashinsky 2002; Reiffenstein 2009). 
The main service sector providing these services is law and law firms, working as 
‘patent attorneys’ in particular, illustrate servicing the business of innovation 
(Reiffenstein 2009). 
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 According to Reiffenstein (2009, 572) law firms ‘by mediating between the private 
interests of firms and the public concerns of the patent office, perform a critical role 
that is not merely ancillary but instrumental to the workings of the knowledge 
economy’. In other words, these law firms are part of the technology community (p. 
579). In terms similar to those used to describe New York’s role in finance, 
Reiffenstein quotes Friedman et al. (1989) as saying that ‘the Silicon Valley lawyer 
not only works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer – a legal 
engineer’ (p. 578). Thus  
‘Silicon Valley occupies a special place in this [patent] system. Its attorneys 
are the “engineers” of business and legal precedent particularly as it relates to 
the translation of science to industry. Firms located there enjoy a locational 
advantage from a proximity to milieus of basic and applied research: buyers 
and sellers of technology’ (p. 580). 
This special place is a strategic place because ‘every one of the major Silicon Valley 
law offices is a component of a much larger branch network’ (p. 579) enabling the 
firm ‘to link buyers and sellers of technology and to lubricate the innovative process 
by linking places’ (p. 580), now necessarily including ‘international transactions’ 
(Lashinsky, 2002). Thus Palo Alto is only a small city but it is a big player in the 
world city network as our strategic-ness analyses have shown. 
Mexico City 
Mexico City is strongly integrated into the world city network (in the top 20 listed in 
Table 1) but according to our analyses it is relatively underconnected strategically 
(Table 6). We will use Parnreiter’s (2010) study of how APS firms in Mexico City 
operate in global commodity chains to interpret our findings in this case. 
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 Parnreiter (2010, 36-7) begins by asking the crucial question, does the APS sector in 
Mexico City function as merely enabling agent of economic globalization or do these 
firms help shape the nature of the production networks they are servicing? To answer 
the question he finds he has to break with Sassen’s (1991) ‘equating the management 
of the world economy with its control’ (p. 43). These are two separate mechanisms 
that are ‘frequently conflated’ despite the fact that  
‘it is questionable whether all high-wage, high-tech and high-profit services 
necessary for running global production processes are actually related to 
decision-making. This question is particularly relevant to global cities in non-
core countries, which have a sizeable producer service sector but are normally 
not considered to host decision-making capacities’ (p. 44). 
Thus although many of the practitioners he interviewed emphasize the importance of 
their local office within the world city network, Parnreiter is able to show that this is 
largely necessary work but not strategic work. He concludes 
‘Though at first glance it seems that the networks of producer service firms are 
rather flat, their organizational model implies that there is the chain of 
command. Despite the fact that the local cooperation is … seen as … essential 
to do business, the “big” strategies are made by the lead partners [and] the 
number of lead partners an office of a global service provider can have 
depends … by and large on the geography of headquarters of TNCs. Since 
there are far fewer companies with origins in Mexico that compete 
successfully in the world market than foreign firms in Mexico, the Mexico 
City offices of accountancy, legal or real estate firms will not often be in 
command’ (p. 47). 
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This is entirely consistent with our finding on the differences between Mexico City’s 
global network connectivity and its strategic network connectivity. 
 
Since Parnreiter frames his argument in world-systems terms, we are invited to 
extrapolate this interpretation to other important cities from ‘non-core countries’: 
from Table 6 and Figure 1 this would include São Paulo, Jakarta, Buenos Aires, Kuala 
Lumpur, Delhi, and Mumbai. But not all cities from non-core countries are 
strategically underconnected. 
Johannesburg 
Bangkok and Johannesburg are the exceptions to Parnreiter’s argument in our 
analyses (Table 6, Figure 1). In this case we use Surborg’s (2011) study that employs 
positionality as his ‘point of departure’ (p. 325) and treats ‘cities in the third world for 
what they are: places occupying a very specific position in the world economy, each 
one of them a unique place’ (p. 326).  
 
Drawing on Rogerson (2005), Surborg (2011) provides hints at what is unique about 
Johannesburg that may have enabled it to be more strategic than expected in a world 
of ‘uneven connections’. Put simply, in the post-apartheid era, ‘Johannesburg’s 
experience was different from most other major cities in southern Africa because 
South Africa’s liberalisation of its economy was largely a result of domestic policy, 
while that of other countries … was usually the result of externally enforced structural 
adjustment policies’ (p. 324). Beyond his African comparisons, we can note that this 
posited relative autonomy can be also contrasted with Mexico City ‘trapped’, as it 
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were, in the North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA).2 Both Johannesburg 
and Mexico City can be designated ‘gateway cities’ linking ‘national “investment 
opportunities” to global circuits of capital’ (p. 319) but whereas Parnreiter (2010, 50) 
concludes that Mexico City operates as ‘a “bridgehead” for the interests of the 
dominant centres of the world economy’, Johannesburg’s recent trajectory may have 
encompassed more autonomy in the world economy for its economic elites resulting 
in the city’s ‘specific position’ being more strategic in the world city network.3  
 
A note of caution has to be inserted here. We do not have anywhere near the quality 
of evidence upon which Parnreiter (2010) based his Mexico City research for our 
understanding of Johannesburg in the world city network. Thus at this time, ideas 
about the reasons for Johannesburg’s strategic positioning remain in the realm of 
speculation. Our findings for this city suggest further research is needed to pinpoint 
the mechanism attracting strategic APS firms to Johannesburg.  
2 The fact that Toronto, the only Canadian city to be included in our 46 strategic places, is 
ranked bottom in both lists in Table 6 does clearly suggest that NAFTA has tended to work 
for the benefit of APS firms in leading US cities at the expense of their Canadian and 
Mexican counterparts. 
3 For recent examples of two of our ‘strategic firms’, see ‘New Johannesburg Office: A 
Gateway to Africa for Canadian Mining Companies’ at 
emailcc.com/rv/ff000884c0cfb0734ec2b80e1d49beb856820713 (accessed 01-Sep-2012), and 
see ‘Bain & Company expands Financial Services practice in South Africa’ where it is 
announced that ‘We are growing our team of financial specialists at a time of global 
challenges and unique opportunities for South Africa’s leading players’ at 
www.bain.com/about/press/press-releases/bain-and-company-expands-financial-services-
practice-in-south-africa.aspx (accessed 01-Sep-2012). 
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German Cities 
German cities have tended to rank comparatively low on global network connectivity 
in previous studies of the world city network, due to the polycentric character of the 
national urban system (Hoyler 2011; Lüthi et al. 2012)4 but in the analysis above 
(Table 6) two German cities, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, are found to be Europe’s 
leading cities in terms of relative strategic-ness. This signals not only the overall 
significance of the German market for globally operating advanced producer services, 
but particularly the relative importance of the two cities in legal and consultancy 
services (Taylor et al. 2011b, Tables 11.5 and 11.6).5 Frankfurt’s strategic position 
comes as no surprise: as the country’s leading financial center and major hub for 
specialist business services, the city and its wider region have long been a gateway to 
Germany for transnational firms, particularly those originating in the US (Grote 2008; 
Hoyler et al. 2008) and in more recent years it has led Europe in its connections with 
Pacific Asia (Taylor et al. 2011b, Table 11.7c). Düsseldorf’s outstanding strategic role 
lies in its specialization as location for international business services accessing the 
country’s largest metropolitan region, Rhine-Ruhr (Knapp et al. 2006). It also 
occupies a specific niche as Europe’s second largest center for Japanese economic 
activity (after London) (Glebe 2003, 100), a global orientation the city actively seeks 
4 Although Germany has by far the largest economy in Europe, the leading cities in the UK 
(London), France (Paris), Italy (Milan) and Spain (Madrid) all have larger global network 
connectivities than Frankfurt, Germany’s most connected city. 
5 Düsseldorf’s Office of Economic Development particularly highlights its prowess in law 
and management consultancy – see ‘Unrivalled density of top law firms and management 
consultancies’ at www.duesseldorf.de/en/economic/standort/dienstleistungen.shtml (accessed 
01-Sep-2012)  
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to expand to other Pacific Asian economies, most notably China. Germany’s major 
economic center in the south, Munich, also features among the 46 cities in this 
analysis, highlighting a distinctive geography of market access and functional 
specialisation in advanced producer services, particularly in finance, law and 
management consultancy, which distinguishes the three cities from the larger but less 
specialised cities of Berlin and Hamburg. 
 
The geography of strategic-ness uncovered for German cities is therefore different 
from the one found in China, the only other state, apart from the US, with three 
strategic places in the analysis, missing out the capital city (for historical reasons, see 
Krätke 2001) but demonstrating strategic attraction across a number of key cities 
within a comparatively small territory. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has added to our knowledge of the contemporary world city network by 
going beyond the basic measurement of global network connectivities to show a 
distinctive pattern of strategic network connectivities. Our findings appear credible 
and have been shown to link with literatures on selected individual cities. There are, 
of course, caveats to bear in mind when assessing these results overall. 
• We have not produced definitive strategic places but rather specific strategic 
places relating to one economic sector, advanced producer services. We do 
argue the particular importance of this sector for economic globalization but 
there will be other strategic places for global commodity chains defined by 
other criteria. 
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• We have provided a cross-sectional analysis for 2010 to define city 
positionalities but, of course, these are inherently historical; information on 
city trajectories is a necessary addition to make better sense of our results. 
• The latter point is very relevant to the fact we have used two USA (with 
London) location strategies of firms as the basis of the analysis, selected from 
ten identified location strategies. This choice was justified by their being both 
the most important strategies identified and because they are from the world 
region that largely generated economic globalization. However it is their 
recent history and present that are being designated ‘most important’; but this 
designation may be less relevant for the future in a dynamic world economy: 
Pacific Asian, especially China, location strategies will have their own 
emerging strategic places that our methodology is not designed to find. 
What we have been able to do is provide some order in an increasingly complex 
economy through excavating strategic places within world city network structures. In 
this way we present an extensive picture in which to view the mechanisms of 
contemporary economic globalization.  
 
We began with Sassen’s ‘global cities’ as new strategic places that have solved the 
problem of providing operational capacity in a new global economy. Although 
restricting ourselves to ‘spatial’ identification of the strategic, this concept has still 
emerged as a multifarious mix of processes. In particular, our strategic places appear 
to have various combinations of command capacity and generation of innovations. 
These sometimes related but quite different functions have a common property of 
working best where there is ‘buzz’, the hallmark of global cities (Storper and 
Venables 2004). This urban externality is built upon face-to-face exchanges, both 
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formal and informal. This relates global cities as strategic places to a key issue in 
economic globalization of how to develop and maintain the necessary face-to-face 
working relations in economic activities simultaneously being conducted in widely 
separated places. Jones (2007) has tackled this question by identifying ‘five drivers 
behind the need for face-to-face interaction’ (p. 231) that ‘shape the development of 
corporate globality’ (p. 230): 
1. to maintain transnational operation 
2. to undertake transnational control functions 
3. to foster transnational knowledge practices 
4. to stimulate transnational innovation practices, and 
5. to maintain corporate coherence. 
Our study has indicated how these can be linked to Sassen’s original thesis. Jones 
describes his drivers as overlapping, which means that they can have different 
balances in different cities. Thus it is that our 46 cities as strategic places will vary in 
their strategic-ness in relation to the strength of the drivers operating within their 
firms. Our study suggests that strategic-ness is most related to drivers 4 and 2 – 
innovation and control – and the other ‘maintenance’ drivers are more to do with 
general network operations.  
 
We will finish with a further comment on comparing London and New York, 
indisputably global cities as classically described by Sassen (1991) and featuring as 
perhaps the most interesting finding of our study. Our finding has separated them in 
terms of their strategic-ness but what does this mean for the future? One implication 
of strategy is that it is long term as opposed to tactical and operational. This suggests 
that in the aggregate, the more strategic a place, the more resilient it should be. 
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Translated to global cities, this means New York is likely to be more resilient than 
London in an increasingly dynamic world economy. But we have also disaggregated 
strategic-ness in terms of what their different levels actually mean and this points to a 
quite different interpretation: the basic feature distinguishing New York’s strategic-
ness from London’s is the latter’s leadership in service innovation. This appears to 
work as New York generating innovations, which are then widely applied in London 
for global consumption. Thus the economic success of the two global cities appears to 
parallel Jacobs’ (1969, 39) ‘two master economic processes’: new work through 
innovation in city economies, and diffusion of new work by import replacement in 
city economies. Clearly while global city New York is a case of the former, we can 
add that global city London is a case of the latter. The key point is that innovation is 
more complex and less common than import replacement (as simpler imitation and 
adaption). It might well be that if the dynamism of the world economy does 
precipitate a move in the center of gravity eastwards, as commonly predicted, then 
New York’s strategic innovation character may be less resilient than London’s 
strategic imitation character: probably new work through other’s innovations (from 
wherever) will be easier to sustain than specific, local innovative activity itself. In this 
argument London can better adapt to western relative decline as the world’s most 
resilient global city. 
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Table 1 Frequency of Leading Dyad Partners of the Top 20 Cities 
  





1 London 9 
2 New York 10 
3 Hong Kong 8 
4 Paris 6 
5 Singapore 8 
6 Tokyo 6 
7 Shanghai 8 
8 Chicago 3 
9 Dubai 0 
10 Sydney 1 
11 Milan 0 
12 Beijing 6 
13 Toronto 0 
14 São Paulo 0 
15 Madrid 1 
16 Mumbai 0 
17 Los Angeles 4 
18 Moscow 0 
19 Frankfurt 8 
20 Mexico City 0 
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Table 2 Intensive and Extensive Globalization 
 
INTENSIVE Scores EXTENSIVE Scores 
    
Home-region  Home-region  
New York 4.80 New York 2.21 
Chicago 4.31 Chicago 1.90 
Washington 3.86 London 1.59 
London 3.73 San Francisco 0.84 
Los Angeles 3.29   
San Francisco 2.59 Global outreach  
Palo Alto 2.18 Johannesburg 1.51 
Boston 1.56 Mexico City 1.50 
Philadelphia 1.38 Istanbul 1.49 
Houston 1.36 Sydney 1.46 
Dallas 0.97 Dubai 1.44 
Pittsburgh 0.96 Kuala Lumpur 1.43 
Atlanta 0.73 Athens 1.42 
  Buenos Aires 1.38 
Global outreach  Toronto 1.26 
Brussels 1.48 Copenhagen 1.11 
Frankfurt 1.11 Santiago 1.11 
Paris 1.04 Mumbai 1.08 
Hong Kong 0.81 Lima 1.06 
Tokyo 0.68 Paris 1.06 
Beijing 0.68 Manila 1.04 
  Caracas 0.99 
  Beirut 0.98 
  Cairo 0.94 
  Warsaw 0.90 
  Milan 0.90 
  Amsterdam 0.90 
  Bucharest 0.89 
  Lisbon 0.88 
  Moscow 0.87 
  Taipei 0.87 
  Tel Aviv 0.85 
  Stockholm 0.85 
  Kiev 0.81 
  Madrid 0.80 
  Vienna 0.75 
  Seoul 0.72 
  Barcelona 0.69 
  Jakarta 0.68 
 
Component scores are derived from a principal components analysis in which ten 
components were extracted and rotated using varimax criteria – for more details see 
Taylor et al. (2012b). 
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measure Sector Headquarters 
Sidley Austin 0.16 Law Chicago 
Kirkland & Ellis 0.15 Law Chicago 
ZS Associates 0.15 Man. consultancy Chicago 
Wunderman 0.14 Advertising New York 
Dewey & LeBoeuf 0.14 Law New York 
A.T. Kearney 0.14 Man. consultancy Chicago 
The Boston Consulting Group 0.13 Man. consultancy Boston 
McKinsey & Company 0.13 Man. consultancy New York 
NERA Economic Consulting  0.12 Man. consultancy New York 
Monitor Group  0.12 Advertising Boston 
DDB Worldwide 0.12 Advertising New York 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 0.12 Law Los Angeles 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 0.12 Law New York 
McDermott Will & Emery National 0.11 Law Chicago 
Booz & Company 0.11 Man. consultancy New York 
Bain & Company 0.11 Man. consultancy Boston 
Goldman Sachs Group 0.11 Financial New York 
Sullivan & Cromwell 0.11 Law New York 
Baker & McKenzie 0.11 Law Chicago* 
L.E.K. Consulting  0.11 Man. consultancy London 
Saatchi and Saatchi 0.11 Advertising New York 
Morgan Stanley 0.10 Financial New York 
TBWA Worldwide 0.10 Advertising New York 
Latham & Watkins 0.10 Law Los Angeles* 
Wells Fargo 0.10 Financial San Francisco 
    
   
* original (first) office, the firm claims to operate without a headquarters 
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of offices  
Connectivity 
per office 
1 New York 10951 25 438.04 
2 London 9316 25 372.64 
3 Chicago 7629 24 317.88 
4 Paris 7023 22 319.23 
5 Hong Kong 6744 20 337.20 
6 San Francisco 6484 24 270.17 
7 Los Angeles 6325 23 275.00 
8 Sydney 6219 18 345.50 
9 Singapore 6126 17 360.35 
10 Tokyo 6110 22 277.73 
11 Shanghai 6019 23 261.70 
12 Milan 5731 19 301.63 
13 Frankfurt 5613 20 280.65 
14 Beijing 5581 22 253.68 
15 Moscow 5201 17 305.94 
16 Miami 5040 11 458.18 
17 São Paulo 4994 15 332.93 
18 Dubai 4937 15 329.13 
19 Bangkok 4766 13 366.62 
20 Washington 4748 19 249.89 
21 Madrid 4714 17 277.29 
22 Johannesburg 4460 11 405.45 
23 Düsseldorf 4451 11 404.64 
24 Toronto 4445 15 296.33 
25 Mumbai 4394 13 338.00 
26 Mexico City 4343 13 334.08 
27 Dallas 4327 12 360.58 
28 Buenos Aires 4132 12 344.33 
29 Amsterdam 4128 11 375.27 
30 Jakarta 4118 11 374.36 
31 Stockholm 4079 12 339.92 
32 Melbourne 4061 14 290.07 
33 Seoul 4052 13 311.69 
34 Kuala Lumpur 4035 10 403.50 
35 Munich 4002 15 266.80 
36 Auckland 3952 10 395.20 
37 Brussels 3846 14 274.71 
38 Taipei 3790 11 344.55 
39 Boston 3712 14 265.14 
40 Warsaw 3630 10 363.00 
41 Zurich 3562 12 296.83 
42 Riyadh 3547 12 295.58 
43 Rome 3475 13 267.31 
44 Delhi 3412 12 284.33 
45 Houston 3255 13 250.38 
46 Palo Alto 2385 12 198.75 
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Table 5 Strategic Network Connectivity Compared to Global Network 
Connectivity 
 
SNC rank City GNC rank Differences 
1 New York 2 1 
2 London 1 -1 
3 Chicago 8 5 
4 Paris 4 0 
5 Hong Kong 3 -2 
6 San Francisco 27 21 
7 Los Angeles 17 10 
8 Sydney 10 2 
9 Singapore 5 -4 
10 Tokyo 6 -4 
11 Shanghai 7 -4 
12 Milan 11 -1 
13 Frankfurt 19 6 
14 Beijing 12 -2 
15 Moscow 18 3 
16 Miami 29 13 
17 São Paulo 14 -3 
18 Dubai 9 -9 
19 Bangkok 42 23 
20 Washington 28 8 
21 Madrid 15 -6 
22 Johannesburg 47 25 
23 Düsseldorf 48 25 
24 Toronto 13 -11 
25 Mumbai 16 -9 
26 Mexico City 20 -6 
27 Dallas 38 11 
28 Buenos Aires 22 -6 
29 Amsterdam 21 -8 
30 Jakarta 26 -4 
31 Stockholm 49 18 
32 Melbourne 31 -1 
33 Seoul 24 -9 
34 Kuala Lumpur 23 -11 
35 Munich 34 -1 
36 Auckland 71 35 
37 Brussels 25 -12 
38 Taipei 43 5 
39 Boston 36 -3 
40 Warsaw 37 -3 
41 Zurich 32 -9 
42 Riyadh 80 38 
43 Rome 52 9 
44 Delhi 33 -11 
45 Houston 55 10 
46 Palo Alto 263 217 
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Table 6 Strategic Network Connectivity Related to Global Network 
Connectivity 
 
SNC as a % of GNC   SNC regressed against GNC 
Rank City %SNC Rank City 
Regression 
residual 
1 Palo Alto 16.45% 1 New York 2.53 
2 San Francisco 11.40% 2 San Francisco 2.36 
3 Chicago 10.63% 3 Chicago 2.26 
4 Auckland 10.09% 4 Palo Alto 1.51 
5 Riyadh 9.97% 5 Los Angeles 1.36 
6 New York 9.95% 6 Bangkok 0.98 
7 Los Angeles 9.85% 7 Auckland 0.93 
8 Düsseldorf 9.81% 8 Düsseldorf 0.92 
9 Bangkok 9.80% 9 Miami 0.79 
10 Johannesburg 9.46% 10 Riyadh 0.78 
11 Miami 9.36% 11 Johannesburg 0.74 
12 Frankfurt 9.15% 12 Frankfurt 0.74 
13 Stockholm 9.07% 13 Paris 0.63 
14 Paris 8.82% 14 Stockholm 0.48 
15 Sydney 8.73% 15 Sydney 0.47 
16 Dallas 8.65% 16 Dallas 0.26 
17 Washington 8.58% 17 Washington 0.24 
18 Milan 8.35% 18 Milan 0.11 
19 Shanghai 8.23% 19 Shanghai 0.01 
20 Tokyo 8.22% 20 Tokyo 0.00 
21 Moscow 8.21% 21 Moscow -0.01 
22 Beijing 8.20% 22 Beijing -0.02 
23 London 7.99% 23 Rome -0.26 
24 Hong Kong 7.93% 24 Munich -0.27 
25 Munich 7.85% 25 Taipei -0.29 
26 Rome 7.82% 26 London -0.31 
27 Taipei 7.80% 27 Hong Kong -0.32 
28 Singapore 7.78% 28 Melbourne -0.40 
29 São Paulo 7.68% 29 Houston -0.43 
30 Melbourne 7.68% 30 Singapore -0.45 
31 Houston 7.52% 31 São Paulo -0.47 
32 Boston 7.37% 32 Boston -0.58 
33 Madrid 7.32% 33 Warsaw -0.67 
34 Warsaw 7.24% 34 Jakarta -0.76 
35 Jakarta 7.22% 35 Madrid -0.77 
36 Mexico City 7.09% 36 Buenos Aires -0.90 
37 Buenos Aires 7.06% 37 Mexico City -0.92 
38 Seoul 6.98% 38 Zurich -0.95 
39 Kuala Lumpur 6.94% 39 Seoul -0.96 
40 Dubai 6.90% 40 Kuala Lumpur -0.99 
41 Zurich 6.86% 41 Amsterdam -1.12 
42 Mumbai 6.83% 42 Delhi -1.13 
43 Amsterdam 6.83% 43 Mumbai -1.18 
44 Brussels 6.63% 44 Brussels -1.22 
45 Delhi 6.59% 45 Dubai -1.24 
46 Toronto 6.54% 46 Toronto -1.50 
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Figure 1 Strategic places in the world city network, 2010 
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